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Federal Courts: Alexander v. Sandoval: Civil Rights
Without Remedies
The government ofthe UnitedStates has been emphaticallytermed
a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation,ifthe lawsfurnishno remedyfor the
violation of a vested legal right.'
I Introduction
Since Congress enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which
prohibits agencies that receive federal funds from discriminating based on race,
color, or national origin,3 the United States Supreme Court has debated how to
interpret that title. Interpreting the statute is inherently difficult because the
statutory language itself is ambiguous. Specifically, the statute does not define
"discrimination" and fails to make clear whether a private right of action is
available to enforce violations of the statute itself and/or regulations issued by
administrative agencies pursuant to the statute. This ambiguity has forced the
U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether to imply a private right of action
under the statute. The Court, in discerning whether it should imply a private
right of action, has struggled to reach a consensus on what factors to assess
when making such a determination.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,4 the Court addressed the private right of
action issue and held that a private right of action is available to enforce Title
VI. Twenty-two years later, however, in Alexander v. Sandoval,6 the Court
limited the holding in Cannon to section 601 of Title VI, which prohibits only
intentional discrimination. TheAlexanderCourt refused to imply a private right
of action to enforce regulations issued under section 602 of Title VI. 7 As a
consequence of Alexander, victims of disparate impact discrimination, which
section 602 regulations prohibit, are left without an adequate remedy to protect
their rights.
Part II of this note reviews Supreme Court precedent to explain the differing
burdens of proof a plaintiff must establish when trying to prove either disparate
impact or intentional discrimination. Part III surveys Supreme Court precedent
I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
3. Id.

4. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
5. Id. at 709.

6. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
7. Id. at 294.
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to see how the Court has defined the scope of discrimination under Title VI.
Part IV reviews the methods the Supreme Court uses to determine whether a
statute provides an implied private right of action and examines the decisions of
circuit courts in relation to the availability of a private right of action under Title
VI. Part V explains how the Alexander Court determined that an implied right
of action is available under section 601 of Title VI but not under section 602 of
the same title. Part VI analyzes the majority's reasoning in Sandoval and
discusses why the Court should have looked outside the text of section 602 to
determine its implications. Part VII discusses Title VI enforcement through 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and Part VIII suggests that the Court may soon find section 602
disparate impact regulations to be invalid.
. UnderstandingDiscrimination:The Intent Requirement
Significant differences exist between disparate impact and intentional
discrimination. For example, each carries a different burden of proof for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Two important Supreme
Court cases dealing with discrimination lawsuits help to explain these
differences.
A. Washington v. Davis
In Washington v. Davis,8 the District of Columbia police department denied
employment to a group of black males after they failed to meet the score
requirement on a written personnel test administered by the department.9 The
applicants filed a class action suit against the department, claiming that the test
had a racially disproportionate impact and therefore violated the Due Process
Clause"0 of the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution."
The applicants in Davis based their claim solely on a disparate impact
standard, arguing that the racially disproportionate effect of the test alone
violated the Fifth Amendment. 2 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
plaintiffs' contention, holding that where a statute or regulation is facially
neutral, a showing of a racially disproportionate impact alone cannot establish
a prima facie case of discrimination under the Constitution. 3 The Court stated

8. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
9. Id. at 233.
10. The Due Process Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment provides that "[no person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Davis, 426 U.S. at 234.
12. Id. at 235.
13. Id. at242.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss1/9
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that a plaintiff must prove intentional, or invidious, discrimination to establish
a constitutional violation. 4
B. Arlington Heights
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.," the Supreme Court elaborated on the factors that courts should weigh
in establishing the existence of intentional discriminatory purpose. The Court
noted that although a racially disproportionate impact may provide a starting
point to establishing a case of intentional discrimination, a plaintiffmust present
other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support such an allegation. 6
The Court listed historical background of the decision, specific sequence of
events leading up to the decision, departures from normal procedure, and
legislative or administrative history as a few of the many factors that courts
should consider when determining the presence of intentional discriminatory
purpose. "
Both the Davis and Arlington Heights Courts noted that in some cases a
showing of racially disproportionate impact alone might establish the existence
of intentional discriminatory purpose." But the Arlington Heights Court noted
that "such cases are rare" and involve "a clear [discriminatory] pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race."' 9 Therefore, after the rulings in
Davis and Arlington Heights, if an agency can justify its policies on grounds
other than race, and the policies are facially neutral, courts will consider the
policies valid even though they may disproportionally impact racial minorities.20
Absent a showing of intentional discriminatory purpose through the difficult
gathering of circumstantial evidence, a racially disproportionate impact alone
does not amount to a constitutional violation.

14. Id.
15. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
16. Id. at 266.
17. Id.at 267-68.
18. See id. at 266; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
19. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
20. See, e.g., Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556 (11 th Cir. 1996); Bowman v. City of Franklin,
980 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992); RI.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149-50 (E.D. Va.
1991), af'd,977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. MaconBibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885-87 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd,
896 F.2d 1264 (1Ith Cir. 1989); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673,
677-78 (S.D. Tex. 1979), affd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
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III. DefiningDiscrimination Under Title VI
A. The Structure of Title VI
Section 601 of Title VI is the substantive portion of the Civil Rights Act that
serves as a mandate from Congress. Section 601 provides that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."'" As evidenced by the language itself, section 601 is broad,
ambiguous, and requires judges to interpret the meaning of the statute,
particularly the scope of the term "discrimination." 2
In contrast to the substantive prohibition on discrimination mandated in
section 601, section 602 of Title VI acts as a procedural mandate from Congress
to federal agencies responsible for administering federal assistance. Section 602
provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is

authorized and directedto effectuate the provisions of [section 601]
of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the
action is taken. 3
Section 601, as well as the rules and regulations issued by federal agencies
and departments under section 602, share a common purpose: to prohibit federal
funds from being distributed in a discriminatory manner based on "race, color,
or national origin. 2 4 Section 601 acts as a substantive mandate from Congress,
and section 602 directs federal departments and agencies responsible for the
distribution of federal funds to issue rules and regulations to "effectuate" this
substantive mandate.2 5 Because the statute does not define the term
"discrimination," however, the scope of the term in the context of section 601,
as well as under the rules and regulations issued under section 602, is unclear. 26

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
See id.
Id.§ 2000d-1 (emphasis added).
Id.§ 2000d.
See id. § 2000d-1.
See id.§ 2000d.
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This ambiguity has required the Supreme Court to undertake the difficult task
of interpreting what constitutes impermissible discrimination under Title VI.
B. Prior US. Supreme Court DecisionsInterpretingTitle VI
In the case Lau v. Nichols," the Supreme Court faced the task of deciding
whether San Francisco's policy of refusing to provide English language
instruction in its public schools violated the Title VI rights of Chinese-speaking
students.28 The Court answered the question in the affirmative.29 Notably, the
students prevailed on their claim without demonstrating that the school system
had intentionally discriminated against them. Rather than require the students
to prove intentional discrimination, the Court allowed the students to prove a
Title VI violation based solely on a showing of discriminatory effects, or
disparate impact.3 °
Four years after the Lau decision, the Court cast a cloud of doubt over the
validity of that ruling when it decided Regents of University of Californiav.
Bakke.3 In Bakke, the Court confronted whether a university's affirmative
action admissions policy favoring minority applicants violated Title VI's ban on
discrimination.32 The policy of discrimination in Bakke was intentional on its
face, and therefore the applicant challenging the university policy easily satisfied
the burden of proof with respect to intent.33 In deciding the case, however, the
Court addressed the issue of intent with respect to which type of discrimination
violates Title VI. Justice Powell, announcing the decision of the Court in an
opinion that was his alone, reasoned that the legislative history behind Title VI
revealed that Congress did not intend Title VI to reach beyond the scope of the
Constitution.34 Although the case resulted in several opinions, a five-Justice
majority held that Title VI is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, based on its decision in Washington v. Davis, the Court held that
Title VI only prohibits intentional discrimination.35
The Bakke decision clarified that Title VI requires plaintiffs to shoulder the
same burden-of-proof problems with intent as they would under a Fourteenth

27. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).

28. Id. at 564.
29. Id. at 568.
30. Id.
31. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

32. Id. at 269-70.
33. Id. at 289.
34. Id. at 287.
35. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and

Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, reached this result. Id.;
id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
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Amendment claim as illustrated in Davis and Arlington Heights.3 6 Requiring
intent under Bakke seems to conflict with the holding in Lau, which requires
only discriminatory impact to establish a prima facie case under Title VI.
Although the Court in Bakke explicitly called into doubt the holding in Lau, the
Court did not clearly overrule it." The Bakke Court predicated its decision on
section 601 of Title VI. 8 Therefore, the Court did not address whether rules and
regulations issued under section 602 of Title VI were bound by the
constitutional intent requirement or whether, as Lau had previously held, a
plaintiff could prove a Title VI violation based on section 602 disparate impact
regulations.
In GuardiansAss 'n v. Civil Service Commission,"' the Court once again
confronted issues dealing with the scope of discrimination under Title VI.
Although the case rendered several opinions, the Court finally dealt with both
sections 601 and 602 and seemingly formed a majority" in deciding the scope
of prohibited discrimination under both sections. Seven Justices, as opposed to
five in Bakkejoined to reaffirm the holding in Bakke that Title VI is coextensive
with the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore, under section 60 1, a plaintiff
must prove intentional discrimination.4 Five Justices in Guardiansalso held,
36. See id. at 287 ("Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause...."); id. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.").
37. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, wrote in his
concurring opinion:
We recognize that Lau, especially when read in light of our subsequent decision
in Washingtonv. Davis, which rejected the general proposition that governmental
action is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact,
may be read as being predicated upon the view that, at least under some
circumstances, Title VI proscribes conduct which might not be prohibited by the
Constitution. Since we are now of the opinion, for the reasons set forth above, that
Title Vi's standard, applicable alike to public and private recipients of federal
funds, is no broader than the Constitution's, we have serious doubts concerning
the correctness of what appears to be the premise of that decision.
Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
38. In determining the scope of prohibited discrimination under Title VI, Justice Powell
wrote, "The language of § 601, like that of the Equal Protection Clause, is majestic in its
sweep." Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
39. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
40. See infra Part VII.B, for a discussion relating to the validity of the Guardiansholding
with respect to section 602 of Title VI.
41. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens stated that section 601 of Title VI prohibited only intentional discrimination.
Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id
at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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however, that despite the fact that Title VI requires proof of discriminatory
intent, violations of the rules and regulations issued under section 602 do not
require proof of discriminatory intent.42
Two years later, the Court clarified and reaffirmed the Guardiansholdings
in Alexander v. Choate.4 3 Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
stated:
[A] two-pronged holding on the nature of the discrimination
proscribed by Title VI emerged in [Guardians].First, the Court held
that [section 601] itselfdirectly reached only instances of intentional
discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions having an
unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed
through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of
[section 601 ]."
Although the Court in Choate clarified its holding in Guardianswith respect to
the scope of the prohibited discrimination under section 602 regulations, it left
unanswered whether private plaintiffs could enforce such regulations through
an implied right of action.
IV Should CourtsAllow an Implied Right ofAction?
Aside from the problem of determining the scope of the term
"discrimination" under Title VI, the Supreme Court has struggled to determine
whether an implied right of action is available to enforce the statute. In Lau, the
Court allowed a private right of action under section 602 but never explicitly
addressed the issue."' In Bakke, though not all the Justices agreed,46 Justice
42. Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun reached this result, although
for different reasons. Justices Marshall and White believed that Title VI itself, including both
sections 601 and 602, could prohibit disparate impact discrimination despite Bakke. Id. at 590;
id. at 623 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun believed that
section 601 could only prohibit intentional discrimination, but that section 602 regulations
could prohibit disparate impact discrimination because they were "reasonably related" to the
purposes of section 601. Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

43. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
44. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted).
45. The plaintiffs in Lau filed a class action. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974).
The Court granted relief to the class based solely on Title VI. Id. at 566. In particular, the
Court noted that the respondents had violated Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
regulations issued under section 602. Id. at 567-68. From these facts, it seems reasonable that
the Court assumed that a private right of action was available to enforce section 602 regulations.
46. Justice White addressed the issue in a separate opinion and concluded that no private
right of action was available under Title VI. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
387 (1978) (opinion of White, J.).
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Powell stated that a private right of action was available under section 601 to
decide the case, but refused to address the issue separately.47 In Guardians,
several Justices debated the availability of a private right of action under section
602, but no majority emerged to answer definitively the question.4"
A. Cort v. Ash: Searchingfor Congress'sIntent
In Cort v. Ash,49 the Court examined a federal statute in which Congress had
not expressly provided for a private right of action. In attempting to set
guidelines for finding an implied right of action,50 the Court identified four
separate factors for courts to analyze: (1) whether the plaintiff is an intended
beneficiary under the statute; (2) whether there is any explicit or implicit
indication of legislative intent to either create or foreclose a private right of
action; (3) whether a private right of action is "consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme"; and (4) whether "the cause of action [is]
one traditionally relegated to state law ...so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law."'"
B. Applying the CortFactors to Title VI
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,5 2 the Court utilized the four factors
defined in Cort to determine whether it should imply a private right of action
under Title VI. Unlike many courts that had applied the four factors more
flexibly,53 however, the Cannon Court utilized the factors as the sole means to
47. Id.at 284.
48. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued that no private right of action
existed at all under Title VI. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 608 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argued that a plaintiff could not obtain relief under
section 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination because the regulations
themselves were invalid. Id.at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice White argued that a
private right of action was available under section 602, but that the statute limited private
at 598. Justice
plaintiffs to injunctive relief absent a showing of intentional discrimination. Id.
Marshall argued that a private right of action was available under section 602 and that full
compensatory and injunctive relief was available for plaintiffs both in cases of intentional and
dissenting).
disparate impact discrimination. Id.at 624 (Marshall, J.,
49. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
50. Id. at 78.
51. Id.

52. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
53. See. e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979) (analyzing the Trade
Secrets Act using the Cort factors); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977)
(analyzing the Williams Act under the Cort factors, with particular emphasis on the intended
class of beneficiaries); Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding the Cort
factors to be "determinative of courts' authority to imply remedies" under the Federal Aviation
Act).
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discern legislative intent.54 In Cannon, the Court faced the task of deciding
whether it should imply a private right of action under Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act,55 the gender counterpart to Title V. 6
The Court quickly satisfied the first of the Cort factors by looking to the
language of the statute itself. 7 Instead of prohibiting discrimination in a broad
sense as a criminal statute might, the statute prohibited discrimination against
a particular class of persons.5" Therefore, the Court reasoned that Congress
intended these persons to be the beneficiaries of the statute.59 The Court also
quickly satisfied the fourth Cori factor by noting that protection against
discrimination had historically been a matter delegated to the federal
government and federal courts.'
In analyzing the second Cort factor, the Cannon Court examined whether
Title VI provided an implied private right of action. 6 Congress enacted Title VI
several years prior to Title IX, and it served as the model for Title IX 62 The
Court noted that during the years between the enactment of Title VI and Title
IX, several lower federal courts had held that Title VI contained an implied right
of action.63 The Court reasoned that Congress must have been aware of court
interpretations of Title VI when it enacted Title IX. Therefore, the Court
concluded that such interpretations reflected congressional intent with respect
65
to Title IX.
When examining the third Cori factor, the Cannon Court considered the
purposes of the legislative schemes of both Title VI and Title IX. 66 In doing so,
the Court noted that Title VI served a dual purpose: (1) to prevent federal funds
from being used in a discriminatory manner; and (2) to protect individuals from
54. At the outset of its inquiry, the Cannon Court stated that "before concluding that
Congress intended to make a remedy available to a special class of litigants, a court must
carefully analyze the four factors that Cartidentifies as indicative ofsuch intent." Cannon, 441
U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 683.
56. The Cannon Court noted, "Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Except for the substitution of the word 'sex' in Title IX to replace the words 'race,
color, or national origin' in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the
benefitted class." Id. at 694-95 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 689.
58. Id. at 690.
59. Id. at 694.
60. Id. at 708.
61. Id. at 694.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 696.
64. Id. at 696-98.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 704.
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those discriminatory practices.6 7 The Court then reasoned that an implied right
of action was consistent, and in some cases necessary, with the second purpose
of Title VI because it served to protect an individual's rights under the statute. 6'
After a thorough analysis of the four Cortfactors, the Cannon Court held that
an implied right of action exists under both Title IX and Title VI. 69 The Court
did not, however, explicitly state whether its holding was limited to section 601
of Title VI or whether it applied to the rules and regulations issued under section
602 as well. In the years following the Cannon decision, circuit courts across
the country would attempt to resolve that issue.
C. The CircuitCourts Speak and Allow an ImpliedRight ofAction Under
Section 602
Because no clear holding emerged from any of the Supreme Court's Title VI
opinions as to whether an implied right of action existed under the rules and
regulations issued under section 602, the issue became one of first impression
for the circuit courts. Every circuit court in the country to consider the issue
either explicitly or implicitly conceded that a private right of action was
available under section 602 of Title VI. Though most of the circuit courts
67. Id.
68. Id. at 706.
69. Id. at 709.
70. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 398 (3d Cir. 1999) (explicitly holding that an
implied right of action exists under section 602 of Title VI); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99
F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Guardiansfor the proposition that "[a] plaintiff
may pursue a claim under a disparate impact theory" pursuant to section 602 of Title VI);
Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Although Title VI itself proscribes
only intentional discrimination, certain regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI prohibit
actions that have a disparate impact on groups protected by the act, even in the absence of
discriminatory intent."); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir.
1995) (per curiam) (stating that "[a] plaintiff alleging a violation of [section 602] regulations
must make a primafacie showing that the alleged conduct has a disparate impact"); David
K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that plaintiffs may maintain a
private cause of action to enforce the regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act. Moreover, plaintiffs need not show intentional discriminatory conduct to prevail
on a claim brought under these administrative regulations.") (citation omitted); Castaneda by
Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 465 n. I1 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[A] Title VI action can now
be maintained in either the guise of a disparate treatment case, where proof of discriminatory
motive is critical, or in the guise of a disparate impact case .... In this latter type of case,
proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary."); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea En Accion
(LUCHA) v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1 st Cir. 1986) ("Under
[Title VI] itself, plaintiffs must make a showing of discriminatory intent; under the [section
602] regulations, plaintiffs simply must show a discriminatory impact."); Larry P. by Lucille
P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that a majority of Justices in
Guardiansheld that "proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability when the suit

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss1/9

2003]

NOTES

decided the issue without conducting a detailed analysis of Title VI or the case
law surrounding it, at least two courts engaged in detailed analyses to reach the
conclusion that an implied right of action existed under section 602."'
Rather than rely exclusively on prior Supreme Court decisions, the Third
Circuit, in Powell v. Ridge, conducted an independent inquiry based on Cortand
its progeny to determine whether an implied right of action was available under
section 602 of Title VI.7 2 Ultimately, after looking to factors such as legislative
intent and the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, the Third Circuit
determined that a plaintiff could enforce section 602 rules and regulations
through a private action.73
Shortly after the Third Circuit's ruling in Powell, the Eleventh Circuit, in
Sandoval v. Hagan,also reached the conclusion that an implied right of action
was available under section 602 of Title VI. 74 Much like the Third Circuit in
Powell,the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a detailed analysis of Title VI in making
this determination.75 After granting certiorari to the appellants in Sandoval,
however, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandovalwould disrupt the settled
expectations of circuit courts across the country and hold, in a 5-4 decision, that
no implied right of action exists under section 602 of Title VI. 76
V Alexander v. Sandoval: No Private Right of Action Under Section 602
A. The Facts
In 1990, the State of Alabama amended its constitution to declare English to
be its official language." Pursuant to this declaration, the Alabama Department
of Public Safety administered state driver's license examinations solely in
English.78 The Alabama Department of Public Safety had accepted financial
assistance grants from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) as well as
the Department of Transportation (DOT).7 9 Because the Alabama Department
is brought to enforce [section 602] regulations issued pursuant to (Title VI] rather than [Title
VI] itself").
71. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 507(1 Ith Cir. 1999); Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d
387 (3d Cir. 1999).
72. Powell, 189 F.3d at 398; see also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (an earlier decision by the Third Circuit that is riferenced
throughout the analysis in Powell).
73. Powell, 189 F.3d at 399.
74. Hagan, 197 F.3d at 507.
75. Id.
76. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
77. Id.at 278.
78. Id. at 279.
79. Id.at 278.
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of Public Safety had accepted such federal financial assistance, it subjected itself
to the rules and regulations issued by the DOJ under section 602 of Title VI.80
Pursuant to section 602 of Title VI, the DOJ had issued a regulation
prohibiting funding recipients from administering federal funds in a manner that
had the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination. 8' Sandoval brought
suit against the Department of Public Safety, arguing that its policy of
administering driver's license examinations exclusively in English had the effect
of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national
origin. 2
The District Court for the Middle District of Alabama agreed with Sandoval,
enjoined the policy, and ordered the Department of Public Safety to
accommodate non-English speakers.83 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the
State argued that the district court should not have permitted Sandoval to initiate
suit because section 602 does not contain an implied right of action. 4 The Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the State, held that an implied
right of action did exist under section 602, and affirmed the judgment of the
district court.85
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected Sandoval's notion that
arguments favoring an implied right of action under section 602 could be based
on language from earlier Supreme Court decisions such as Guardians and
Cannon. 6 Instead, Justice Scalia stated unequivocally, "This Court is bound by
holdings, not language."8 7 Bound by holdings, Justice Scalia reasoned that
because neither Cannon nor Guardians,nor any other decision of the Court, had
explicitly held that section 602 contains a private right of action, the

80. Id.
81. Id. The DOJ regulation provided:
A recipient ...may not... utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects individuals of a
particular race, color, or national origin.
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2001).
82. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279.
83. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1315-16 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
84. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 487 (1Ith Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at511.
86. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
87. Id.
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respondents' arguments relying on the language of those decisions were
foreclosed."
Instead, Justice Scalia focused on section 602 itself to determine whether it
contains an implied right of action. Justice Scalia reasoned that if an implied
right of action exists under section 602, it could not be found by looking to
section 601 or its legislative history but instead had to come "from the
independent force of§ 602."" 9 In focusing on section 602, Justice Scalia argued
that "statutory intent" determined whether an implied right of action exists. 9
In his analysis, Justice Scalia determined that there was no evidence that
Congress intended to provide a private right of action to enforce the rules and
regulations under section 602. 9' Indeed, Congress had expressly provided in
section 602 that the departments and agencies responsible for issuing the rules
and regulations could terminate funding to recipients who refused to comply
with such rules.92 Because Congress had already expressly provided for this
remedy under section 602, Justice Scalia argued that it was unlikely that
Congress also intended a private right of action to be available to enforce section
602 rules and regulations.93 Therefore, based on an independent analysis of
section 602 focusing exclusively on statutory construction, the majority
concluded that Congress did not intend section 602 to contain an implied private
right of action.94
C. The Dissent

Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated, "Today, in a decision
unfounded in our precedent and hostile to decades of settled expectations, a
majority of this Court carves out an important exception to the right of private
action long recognized under Title VI.""g Justice Stevens argued that the
88. Id. at 283-84.
89. Id. at 286. This view seems to conflict directly with the Court's statement in Cannon
that "the Cart analysis requires consideration of legislative history." Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,

441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979).
90. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.

91. Id.at288-91.
92. Section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
(I) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding
on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such
requirement ... or (2) by any other means authorized by law.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-i (2000).
93. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289-91.
94. Id. at 293.
95. Id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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majority misunderstood the relationship between section 601 and section 602,
misinterpreted the reasoning of past Supreme Court decisions endorsing a
private right of action under Title VI, and misconstrued the "theoretical
linchpin" of the Cannon decision.96
According to the dissent, the Court could resolve the issue in Sandoval by
canvassing prior Court opinions.97 Unlike the majority, the dissent argued that
to resolve the issue the Court should look to the reasoning of past decisions
instead of limiting itself to the holdings.9 After reviewing such decisions, the
dissent concluded that the Court had already considered the question presented
and had concluded that section 602 provides a private right of action. 9 In fact,
the dissent noted in its closing remarks that "[g]iven the prevailing consensus in
the Courts of Appeals, the Court should have declined to take this case."'
VI.Analysis: Whiy the Court Erredin Denying a Private Right ofAction
Under Section 602
A. The Majority Treats Section 602 as Separateand Distinctfrom Section
601
When looking to the holdings of prior decisions, the Sandoval majority
distinguished between section 601 and section 602."° ' Section 602, however,
explicitly states that rules and regulations issued under section 602 are to
"effectuate" the provisions of section 601 in a manner that is "consistent with
achievement ofthe objectives ofthe statute.""0 2 As evidenced from the language
of section 602 itself, Congress did not intend courts to interpret section 602 as
separate and distinct from section 601. Furthermore, in Chevron U S.A., Inc. v.
NationalResourcesDefense Council,Inc.,l°3 the Supreme Court held that courts
must give controlling weight to agency regulations that interpret a broadly
worded statute unless they present an unreasonable construction ofthe statutory
text.t" As the dissent in Sandovalargued, the Court should not read section 601
96. Id. at 295 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Justice Scalia wrote, "It is clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not simply
apply § 601 - since they indeed forbid conduct that § 601 permits - and therefore clear that
the private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to enforce these
regulations." Id at 285.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
103. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
104. Id.at 843-44.
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and section 602 as incongruent under Chevron.'°5 Instead, the Court should read
section 602 as granting federal agencies the authority to issue regulations that
offer a reasonable construction of section 601 's purpose."°
The majority's incorrect assumption that the two sections warrant different
0 7 In Guardians,three
treatment stems from a misinterpretation of Guardians.
of the five Justices who voted to uphold section 602 disparate impact regulations
reasoned that rules and regulations issued under section 602 could prohibit
disparate impact discrimination because such rules and regulations furthered the
purpose of section 601." °8 Because the Court in Bakke held that Title VI
prohibited only intentional discrimination, the Sandovalmajority reasoned that
the holding in Guardianswith respect to section 602 was inconsistent with the
holding in Bakke."°9 Therefore, the majority attempted to resolve this
inconsistency by treating section 601 and section 602 as separate and distinct.
Indoing so, the majority retroactively applied their separate-and-distinct method
of analysis and limited the holding in Cannon to section 601 .10
The Cannon Court saw no need to distinguish between section 601 and
section 602,"' arguably because the Court had not yet decided Guardiansand
105. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Justice Scalia quoted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Guardians, id. at 286
n.6, in which she wrote, "If, as five members of the Court concluded in Bakke, the purpose of
Title VI is to proscribe only purposeful discrimination .... regulations that would proscribe
conduct by the recipient having only a discriminatory effect ... do not simply 'further' the
purpose ofTitle VI; they go well beyondthat purpose," Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 613 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Guardians, however, Justice
O'Connor was not one of the five Justices to conclude that section 602 disparate impact
regulations were valid. Of those five Justices, none found section 602 disparate impact
regulations to conflict with the purpose of section 601. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
108. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Justice Scalia wrote:
[W]e must assume for purposes of deciding this case that regulations
promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a
disparate impact on racial groups, even though such activities are permissible
under § 601 ....
These statements are in considerable tension with the rule of
Bakke and Guardians that § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination, but
petitioners have not challenged the regulations here.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82 (citations omitted); see also supra note 107.
110. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
Ill. In Cannon, the Court wrote, "We have no doubt that Congress intendcd to create Title
IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as
authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination."
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979); see also Justice Stevens' dissent in
Sandoval in which he argues that Cannon does not distinguish between section 601 and section
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no reason existed to believe that the two sections should receive separate
analysis. Therefore, much as the Sandoval majority believed that the holding in
Bakke should apply to all of Title VI,1 2 including section 602, so should the
holding in Cannon. Just because the majority believed that the GuardiansCourt
created an inconsistency with respect to the holding in Bakke does not mean that
the Court should permit further inconsistencies by limiting the holding in
Cannonto section 601.
The Sandoval majority focused exclusively on holdings of previous cases. It
is imperative, however, to examine the facts that gave rise to those holdings. As
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, "Cannon was itself a disparate-impact
case.""' In Cannon, the university admissions policies the Court regarded as
sexually discriminatory were neutral on their face." 4 The Court based its
decision on section 901 of Title IX, the gender counterpart to section 601 of
Title VI, but the proof offered by the plaintiff did not reach beyond a disparate
impact standard.'" If the Court had required the plaintiff to show intentional
discrimination in line with the standards set forth in Davis and Arlington
Heights, then she would not have met the burden of proof by presenting
evidence of disparate impact discrimination alone." 6 As evidenced from the
facts in Cannon, however, the plaintiff offered little more than such disparate
impact evidence." 7 Therefore, because the Court in Cannon allowed the
plaintiff to pursue her private right of action under a disparate impact standard,
the Sandovalmajorityshould have concluded thatthe holding in Cannonapplied
to both section 601 and section 602.
B. The Majority's Holding Conflicts with the DualPurpose of Title VI
In determining whether an implied right of action exists under Title VI, the
Court in Cannon noted that Title VI serves a dual purpose: it prohibits the
recipient from distributing federal funds in a discriminatory manner and protects
602. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. The policies disfavored applicants over the age of thirty unless they already possessed
advanced degrees. Because the incidence of interrupted higher education was higher among
women than men, the plaintiffs alleged that the policies had the effect of discriminating on the
basis of sex. Cannon,441 U.S. at 682 n.2.
115. After noting that the incidence of interrupted higher education was higher among
women than men, the Court in Cannon stated that "the existence of the criteria either makes out
or evidences a violation of the medical school's duty under Title IX to avoid discrimination on
the basis of sex." Id.
116. See supra Part II for a discussion of the burden of proof in cases involving intentional
versus disparate impact discrimination.
117. See supra notes 114-15.
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individuals from those discriminatory spending practices."' The Sandoval
holding undermines the second objective - protecting individuals from
discrimination.
Unlike the Cannon Court, the Sandoval majority limited its inquiry to
whether it could determine Congress's intent from the language of section 602
alone." 9 According to the Cort factors, as well as the Cannon Court's
application of those factors, however, the Court should have also analyzed the
legislative scheme or purpose behind the statute to determine whether Congress
intended to create an implied right of action' 20 If the Sandoval majority had
looked at the legislative purpose behind section 602, they would have found that
a private right of action to enforce the rules and regulations under section 602
is fully consistent with Congress's intent.
As the Cannon Court stated, one legislative purpose behind Title VI is to
provide individuals with effective protection against discriminatory spending
practices.' 2' Section 602 expressly provides that federal departments and
agencies may terminate funding to recipients who fail to comply with the rules
and regulations issued under section 602.122 The Sandoval majority reasoned
that the existence of an express remedy under section 602 precluded a finding
that Congress also intended a private right of action to enforce the section 602
rules. 23
' However, the express remedy under section 602 only furthers the first
of Title VI's purposes: prohibiting federal funds from being distributed in a
discriminatory manner. The express remedy does not adequately protect
individuals from discrimination - the second of Title VI's purposes.
Therefore, an implied right of action under section 602 is necessary.
24
The Court reached a similar conclusion inAllen v. State BoardofElections.1
In Allen, a group of disenfranchised voters sought a declaratory judgment that
certain state law voting amendments were subject to section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.125 The Court noted that an express remedy existed under the
Voting Rights Act, which allowed the Attorney General to institute litigation,
but that Congress had granted no express private right of action.' 26 In
determining whether to imply a private right of action to enforce the Voting
118. Cannon,441 U.S. at 704.
119. See supra Part V.B.
120. The third inquiry under Cori is whether "it [is]
consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff." Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,
78(1975).
121. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
122. See supra note 92.
123. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289-91 (2001).

124. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
125. Id.at 550.
126. Id. at 555 n.18.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003

OKLAHOMA LAW RE VIEW

(Vol. 56:205

Right Act, the Court looked to the purpose of the Act and the adequacy of the
express remedy. 27 The Court stated that the Act's purpose was to secure rights
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment for all citizens.' 28 The Court also
reasoned that the purpose of the statute would be "severely hampered" if the
Court left enforcement to the sole discretion of the Attorney General. 29
Therefore, the Court held that "a federal statute passed to protect a class of
citizens, although not specifically authorizing members of the protected class to
institute suit, nevertheless implie[s] a private right of action."' 30
Much like the victims inAllen, the victims of disparate impact discrimination
under Title VI cannot rely on agency enforcement alone adequately to protect
them. Nor would agency enforcement further the statute's purpose of preventing
recipients from spending federal funds in a discriminatory manner. For
example, even though the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated
section 602 disparate impact regulations as early as 1973, it failed to enforce the
regulations until 1993.31 If agencies cannot effectively enforce the rules and
regulations they issue under section 602, then courts should consider a private
right of action as an alternative means of enforcement.' 3 2 Such a remedy is
consistent with the second purpose of Title VI - to protect individuals from
discrimination. Therefore, because courts can infer legislative intent, in part, by
looking to the purpose behind a statute, they could legitimately conclude that
Congress intended such a remedy.
Agency enforcement alone does not adequately protect individual rights. An
agency's administrative investigations provide limited judicial review and give
injured individuals no formal role in the process.'33 Furthermore, because
agency enforcement is often slow, projects receiving short-term federal funding,
such as construction projects, will most likely reach completion by the time an
investigation reveals a Title VI violation.'3 4 Therefore, allowing private
plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief in the courts through a private right of action

127. Id.at 556.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 557.
131. Julia B. Latham Worsham, DisparateImpact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602:
Can a Legal Tool BuildEnvironmental Justice?,27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 631,646 (2000).
132. See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence
of Implied Rights ofAction, 71 NoTREDAME L. REV. 861, 905 (1996).
133. See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of Action Under EPA 's Title VI
Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J.ENvTL. L.
1,23 (1999).
134. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 626 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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is sometimes the only mechanism that will protect the individuals who Congress
enacted Title VI to protect.
The Sandoval majority reasoned that individuals have adequate protection
under Title VI because they have a private right of action under section 601.1
Section 601, however, limits an individual's right to be free from discrimination
by requiring proof of discriminatory intent. 36 As previously discussed, the
Cannon Court did not distinguish between intentional and disparate impact
discrimination in its holding. 37 In fact, the Cannon Court never raised the
subject of intentional discrimination in its analysis. The Sandoval majority
reasoned that because Bakke held that section 601 prohibits only intentional
discrimination, the Cannon Court must have looked to Bakke, a prior decision,
and, therefore, intended its holding to apply only to cases of intentional
38
discrimination as well.
The Sandoval majority's line of reasoning, however, ignores the fact that
Cannon itself was brought under a disparate impact burden of proof.'39 Also, as
previously discussed, when the Court decided Cannon it had yet to distinguish
between sections 601 and 602 as it later would in Guardians. Therefore, it is
much more probable that the Cannon Court intended its holding to reach cases
of disparate impact discrimination under section 602 in addition to section 601
cases of intentional discrimination. Quoting language from Cannon, the
Sandoval dissent argued, "A private right of action exists for 'victims of the
prohibited discrimination.' Not some of the prohibited discrimination, but all
' 40
of it.'
C. Textualism and Implied Rights ofAction: Searchingfor Scalia's Intent
The most obvious, and perhaps greatest, problem in determining whether an
implied right of action exists under a statute is determining the intent of the
legislature. In Cort v. Ash, the Court formulated four factors for courts to
examine when determining whether to imply a private right of action under a
federal statute. 14 1 In Sandoval, however, the Court failed to apply the Corttest.
Instead, the majority stated, "We ... begin (and find that we can end) our search
135. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279-80 (2001).
136. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also supra Part I1for
adiscussion of the burden of proof for intentional discrimination cases.
137. See supra Part VIA.
138. See Sandoval,532 U.S. at 282 n.2 ("[lit is absurd to think that Cannon meant, without
discussion, to ban under Title IX the very disparate-impact discrimination that Bakke said Title
VI permitted.").
139. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
140. Sandoval,532 U.S. at 297 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Cannon
v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)).
141. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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for Congress's intent with the text and structure of Title VI."' 4 2 The Court's
focus on the text of section 602 comes as no surprise, given that Justice Scalia,
the Court's chief proponent of textualism," 3 authored the opinion. The use of
textualism, however, in the implied right of action context is not only squarely
at odds with the Court's decision in Cannon, in which the Court recognized the
four-factor Cort test as the appropriate means to determine Congress's intent,
but also runs contrary to the very concept of an implied right of action.
The use of textualism in the implied right of action context is inherently
problematic. After all, the text of section 602 says nothing about a private right
of action.'" Therefore, by focusing exclusively on the text of the statute, the
Sandoval majority easily concluded that Congress did not intend a private right
of action under section 602.' 4' But the Sandovalmajority's exclusive focus on
the text of the statute to determine intent only seems to beg the question. If the
text of section 602 had provided a private right of action, there would be no need
for the Court to imply one. Textualist analysis in the implied right of action
context, therefore, is outcome determinative. In other words, it is hardly
analysis at all.
The notion that textualist analysis in the implied right of action context is
nothing more than pretense is underscored by Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Thompson v. Thompson.'" In Thompson, the Court held that no implied right
of action exists to enforce the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act. 47 The Court
began its analysis by recognizing the appropriateness ofthe four-factor Corttest
as a means to determine congressional intent. 4" In reaching its decision, the
Court not only looked to the text and structure of the statute, but also to the
legislative history surrounding its enactment. 49 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Scal ia attacked the validity of the four-factor Cort test. 5 ' In fact, Justice
142. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288.
143. Textualism is a form of "strict constructionism," a "doctrinal view of judicial
construction holding that judges should interpret a document or statute ... according to its
literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1434 (7th ed. 1999). For more on Justice Scalia and textualism see generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); William Funk,
Faith in Texts - Justice Scalia's Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution:Apostasyfor
the Rest of Us?, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 825 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning":
Justice Scalia 's Jurisprudenceof Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
401 (1994).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
145. Sandoval,532 U.S. at 293.
146. 484 U.S. 174, 188-92 (1988) (Scalia, I., concurring).
147. Id.at 187.
148. Id at 179.
149. Id.at 183-84.
150. Id.at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Scalia rejected the use of any congressional-intent test in the implied right of
action context.15 ' Instead, Justice Scalia offered this solution: "[W]e should get
out of the business of implied rights of action altogether."' 5 2
In Sandoval, Justice Scalia was apparently unable to persuade four of his
colleagues to join him in an opinion that would explicitly put an end to implied
rights of action. Instead, Justice Scalia convinced the Court to use textualism
as a means to narrow its congressional-intent test. In doing so, Justice Scalia
achieved essentially the same result as explicitly ending implied rights of action
while alleviating any stare decisis concerns such a result may have raised.
Justice Scalia's disingenuousness in the Sandoval opinion is surprising. After
all, Justice Scalia purportedly adheres to the textualist movement based on
notions of political accountability - that Congress should say what it means.
In Sandoval, however, Justice Scalia has done just the opposite. Rather than
render a separate opinion and explicitly state his true intention, as he did in
Thompson, Justice Scalia has struck a compromise to form a majority. As a
result, to discover the full consequence of the Sandoval decision - no more
implied rights of action - Justice Scalia forces us to read between the lines: a
practice in which he himself has consistently refused to engage.
VII. PrivateEnforcement of Section 602 Under § 1983: A Short-Lived
Remedy
A. Cases Establishingthe Availability of§ 1983
In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,'5 3 the Supreme Court
held that a two-step inquiry would determine whether § 1983 is available to
remedy a statutory violation.5 4 First, a plaintiff must allege that a federal right,
as opposed to a federal law, has been violated.'5 5 Second, the plaintiff must
show that Congress did not intend to foreclose a remedy under § 1983.156 To
satisfy the first step of the Golden inquiry, the Court in Blessing v. Freestone...
used a three-part analysis to determine whether a federal statute creates an
individual right. 5 The Court in Blessing held that (1) Congress must have
151. Id.at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[l]fthe current state of the law were to be changed,
it should be moved . . . away from our current congressional intent test to the categorical
position that federal private rights of action will not be implied.").
152. Id. at 192 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
153. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
154. Id. at 106.
155. Id.
156. Id.

157. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
158. Id.at340-41.
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intended that the statute benefit the plaintiff; (2) the right protected by the
statute cannot be "vague and amorphous" and therefore unenforceable by the
judiciary; and (3) "the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be
couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms."' 5 9
In Sandoval, the dissent asserted that despite the majority's holding that an
individual could not bring a private suit under section 602, the same individual
could bring suit under § 1983.16 The Sandovaldissent did not engage, however,
in a detailed analysis of how a plaintiff could apply § 1983 to remedy violations
of the agency regulations issued under section 602. The Sandoval dissent left
unanswered whether agency regulations issued under section 602 of Title VI
constitute "laws" under § 1983, and if so, whether they create enforceable
federal "rights."
B. Applicationof§ 1983 Analysis to Section 602
In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of
EnvironmentalProtection,16' the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey, in the first post-Sandovalcase to address the issue, held that individuals
may enforce section 602 rules and regulations through § 1983.16' The South
Camden court noted that in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 6 3 the Supreme Court held
that federal regulations could have the "force and effect of law."'' 64 Applying
Chryslerto the section 602 regulations, the South Camden court concluded that
section 602 regulations have the "force and effect of law."' 6' Relying on
66
Chryslerand Wright v. City ofRoanoke Redevelopment & HousingA uthority,1
159. Id.
160. SeeAlexanderv. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,299-301 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But
see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610 n.3 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("I... would hold that private actions asserting violations of Title VI may not be
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
161. 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001).
162. Id. at 549.
163. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
164. South Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 528. In determining whether federal regulations
could have the "force and effect of law," the Chrysler Court engaged in a three-part inquiry.
Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03. The South Camden court summarized the inquiry as follows:
[Rlegulations have the "force and effect of law" if they: (I) are substantive,
meaning they function as a "legislative-type rule" which affects individual rights
and obligations; (2) Congress granted the agency which issued the regulations the
authority to promulgate such regulations; [and] (3) the regulations were
promulgated in accordance with any procedural requirements imposed by
Congress ....
South Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
165. South Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 528-29.
166. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
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a case in which the Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to enforce a federal
regulation under § 1983, the court concluded that section 602 regulations fall
within the definition of "laws" under § 1983.67
The South Camden court then applied the three-part Blessing analysis to
6
determine whether the section 602 regulation at issue created federal rights.' 1
The court found that the first inquiry under Blessing - whether the provision
was intended to benefit the plaintiff- was easily satisfied by looking to the
language of the section 602 regulation, which provided that no "person" shall
be made16the subject of discrimination based on "'race, color, [or] national
''
origin. 1
The South Camden court also satisfied the second inquiry under Blessingwhether the right assertedly protected by the provision is so vague and
amorphous that its enforcement would strainjudicial competence. 7 The court
concluded that "[b]ased on ... the experience federal courts have in applying
disparate impact analysis in a variety of contexts," the right of a plaintiff to be
free from disparate impact discrimination "is neither vague, nor amorphous, and
is well within the competence of the judiciary to enforce."''
Finally, the court applied the third inquiry under Blessing - whether the
provision unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the states - to the
section 602 regulation at issue.' 72 The court satisfied this inquiry by looking to
the language of Title VI.' 73 The court relied on the use of the word "shall" in
section 601, "directed" in section 602, and similar mandatory language in the
regulation at issue to support the finding of a mandatory obligation.'7 4 After
satisfying the three-part analysis set forth in Blessing,the court held that section
602 regulations could create rights within the meaning of § 1983, thereby
satisfying the first inquiry under Golden. 75
The South Camden court then turned to the second inquiry under Golden,
which asks whether Congress expressly or impliedly foreclosed a plaintiffs
ability to enforce section 602 regulations under § 1983.176 The court rejected the
167. South Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 529. But see Todd E. Pettys, The Intended
RelationshipBetween AdministrativeRegulations andSection 1983's "Laws, "67 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 51, 75-76 (1998) (arguing that Wright did not hold that regulations could constitute
"laws" under § 1983).
168. South Camden, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 535-42.
169. Id. at 536 (alteration in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 7.30 (2001)).
170. Id. at 541.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 542.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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notion that agency enforcement of section 602 regulations impliedly foreclosed
The court noted that to rebut the strong
enforcement under § 1983.'
presumption of the availability of enforcement under § 1983, a defendant must
The
demonstrate that an elaborate enforcement provision already exists.'
South Camden court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected the notion
that agency power to terminate funds under section 602 constituted such an
elaborate enforcement provision.' 79 Therefore, the court concluded that because
the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of enforcement under § 1983, the
plaintiff had satisfied the second inquiry under Golden.' After satisfying the
two-step inquiry under Golden, the South Camden court held that § 1983 was
disparate
available to remedy violations of the agency regulations prohibiting
81
VI.
Title
of
602
section
to
pursuant
issued
discrimination
impact
On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's analysis and
reversed.' 2 In particular, the court of appeals held that section 602 disparate
impact regulations do not create enforceable rights. The court of appeals
concluded that the analysis set forth in Blessing is not determinative and that a
regulation alone cannot create a right enforceable under § 1983."83 Instead,
much like the majority in Sandoval,the court of appeals focused its inquiry on
congressional intent. The court of appeals stated that to determine "whether a
plaintiff is advancing an enforceable right, the primary consideration [is] to
determine if Congress intended to create the particular federal right sought to be
enforced."'8 4 Because the Supreme Court had previously held that section 601
forbids only intentional discrimination, the court of appeals reasoned that "it
does not follow that the right to be free from disparate impact discrimination can
be located in section 602."' '1 5
177. Id. at 546.

178. Id. at 545.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 546.
181. Id. at 549.
182. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 790-91 (3d
Cir. 2001).
183. Id. at 788.
184. Id.

185. Id. at 789-90. The court of appeals went on to state:
Insum, the regulations, though assumedly valid, are not based on any federal right
present in the statute. .. . [T]he regulations do more than define or flesh out the
content of aspecific right conferred upon the plaintiffs by Title VI. Instead, the
regulations implement Title VI to give the statute a scope beyond that Congress
contemplated, as Title VI does not establish a right to be free of disparate impact
discrimination. Thus, the regulations are "too far removed from Congressional
intent to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under § 1983."
Id. at 790 (quoting Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
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The dissent took issue with the majority's use of congressional intent as the
means to determine whether a regulation can create a right enforceable through
§ 1983.86 The dissent argued that whether a statute creates enforceable rights
under § 1983 "is a different inquiry than that involved in determining whether
a private right of action can be implied in a particular statute."' 7 Therefore, the
dissent concluded that courts should use the test set forth in Blessing solely for
the former inquiry and the test set forth in Cori v. Ash for the latter. ' Although
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in South Camden, 9 the Court affirmed the
appropriateness of using congressional intent as the means to determine whether
a statute creates enforceable rights under § 1983 in another case, Gonzaga
University v. Doe.' 90
In Gonzaga, the Court held that "[a] court's role in discerning whether
personal rights exist in the § 1983 context" is no different "from its role in
discerning whether personal rights exist in the implied right of action
context."' 9' The Court further held that
where the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that
Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for
a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of
action.
In sum, if Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable
under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms ...
...

Clearly, the Court's decisions in Gonzaga and Sandoval will preclude future
litigants from enforcing section 602 disparate impact regulations under § 1983.
Lack of a private enforcement mechanism, however, is not the only problem
victims of section 602 disparate impact discrimination face.
VIII. The UncertainFuture of Section 602 Disparate-ImpactRegulations
In Alexander v. Sandoval the majority stated:
[W]e must assume for the purposes of deciding this case that
regulations promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups,
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. at 796-97 (McKee, J., dissenting).
Id. at 796 (McKee, J., dissenting).
See id.
S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
Id.at 2276.
Id.at 2277, 2279.
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even though such activities are permissible under § 601.... These
statements are in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and
Guardiansthat § 601 forbids only intentional discrimination, but
petitioners have not challenged the regulations here.193
The Sandoval majority had no opportunity to hold that section 602
regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination are invalid because the
validity of the regulations was not at issue in the case. By adding the language
"but petitioners have not challenged the regulations here" to the end of a
statement that casts doubt on the validity of such regulations, however, the
majority seemed to encourage future litigants to contest the issue. If, in fact, a
defendant in a section 602 disparate impact case challenged the regulations
themselves, it appears from the majority's language that the Court would most
likely find the regulations to conflict with section 601 and therefore to be
invalid.'
The Sandoval majority's opinion is not the only evidence that the Court
seems ready and willing to invalidate section 602 regulations forbidding
disparate impact discrimination. In her concurring opinion in Guardians,
Justice O'Connor wrote
If, as five members of the Court concluded in Bakke, the purpose of
Title VI is to proscribe only purposeful discrimination in a program
receiving federal financial assistance, it is difficult to fathom how the
Court could uphold administrative regulations that would proscribe
conduct by the recipient having only a discriminatory effect. Such
regulations do not simply "further" the purpose of Title VI; they go
well beyond that purpose.'95
Justice O'Connor concluded, "Regulations imposing an impact standard are not
valid."" 9
Additionally, because the five Justices in Guardianswho agreed that section
602 disparate impact regulations were valid offered differing reasons in reaching
that conclusion, the question as to whether such regulations are valid remains
open.'9 7 In Marks v. UnitedStates,'98 the Court stated that "[w]hen a fragmented
193. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001) (citation omitted).
194. The Court would most likely invalidate section 602 disparate impact regulations under
the Chevron doctrine, which states that courts must give agency regulations "controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
195. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 613 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
196. Id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
197. Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private DisparateImpact Suits, 34 GA. L. REv.
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Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds .... """ Because the opinions of the five Justices supporting disparate
impact regulations cannot be considered as anything more than dicta, some
commentators argue that, under Marks, they do not constitute a holding of the
Court.2" Because it is questionable whether Guardiansupheld the validity of
section 602 disparate impact regulations, and because Sandoval cast serious
doubt as to the validity of such regulations, it is highly probable that a litigant
will successfully challenge section 602 disparate impact regulations in the near
future.
Conclusion
As long as the Court holds section 602 disparate impact regulations to be
valid, it should allow a private right of action to enforce those regulations. To
hold otherwise creates inconsistencies between section 601 and section 602 that
Congress never intended. Furthermore, to hold otherwise conflicts with one of
the primary objectives of Title VI: to protect individuals from discriminatory
spending practices. By focusing exclusively on the text of section 602 to
determine congressional intent, the Court has effectively signaled an end to its
willingness to imply private rights of action. If this is the Court's intention, it
should say so explicitly rather than using textualism as a means to mask its
intent.
Benjamin Labow

1155, 1204-07 (2000).
198. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
199. Id. at 193 (alteration in original) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15
(1976)).
200. Lambert, supra note 197, at 1207.
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